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In 1852, Jonathan Lemmon and his wife left Virginia for Texas. Evidently
economic hardship was part of the reason. They were poor. Nearly all the
property they had in the world was eight slaves.
Naturally, they brought the slaves along. Traveling over land was
expensive and slow in those days, and the easiest way to go was by boat. But
there was no direct steamship service between any port in Maryland and the
Gulf coast. The usual route was to go first to New York, then change boats,
and take a steamboat to New Orleans.
Ignoring warnings not to take their slaves ashore, the Lemmons went to a
hotel, where they planned to wait the three days for the New Orleans boat.
There they were discovered by a free black, who hurried to court and petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court freed the slaves. Jonathan Lemmon
took his case to the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in the state,
but there he lost again.I
The Court of Appeals held that a slave from Virginia became free the
instant he set foot on New York soil, because slavery could not exist in New
York. New York statutory law so held, and that law was constitutional.
"Every sovereign State has a right to determine by its laws the condition of all
persons who may at any time be within its jurisdiction; to exclude therefrom
those whose introduction would contravene its policy, or to declare the
conditions upon which they may be received.... ,2 The Constitution contained
an exception for fugitive slaves, who had to be returned to their owners, but
that was the only exception to the general rule.3 The state's interest in being
free of slavery did not become less when the slave was merely transient. As a
concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals put it, "[I]t is the status, the unjust
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1. This account is drawn from PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM,
AND COMITY 296-310 (1981).
2. Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 602 (1860).
3. Id. at 603-606.
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and unnatural relation, which the policy of the State aims to suppress, and her
policy fails, at least in part, if the status be upheld at all.
'A
Lemmon might be thought relevant to a contemporary controversy.
Americans are profoundly divided over same-sex marriage. The regional
divide was strikingly evident in the 2004 elections, where voters in twelve
states approved referenda banning such unions, while in Vermont and
Massachusetts, two states in which same-sex unions are recognized, the pro-
recognition factions increased their numbers. (Same-sex unions that are legally
equivalent to marriage are also recognized in California and Connecticut.)
Each side is now striving for total victory. Proponents of same-sex
marriage want a judicial declaration, preferably by the United States Supreme
Court, that same-sex marriage is constitutionally required. Opponents want a
constitutional amendment banning any state from recognizing such marriage.
Neither side is going to get its way any time in the foreseeable future. As
the recent election results show, Americans bring radically differing values to
this question in different parts of the country. We are going to be divided on
this issue for a long time. What we need is a way to live together.
The consequence of our moral divisions need not be hysteria or chaos. The
largest concern arises from the fact that people move around. It's easy to say
that Utah and Massachusetts can each have their own rules, but people from
Massachusetts sometimes travel to Utah, and indeed have a constitutional right
to go there. Can Utah residents get married on a weekend trip to Boston and
then force Utah to recognize the marriage? And what happens if someone from
Massachusetts is hospitalized in Utah, and the hospital needs to know who is
legally authorized to make the patient's medical decisions?
Forty states have laws on the books declaring that they will not recognize
foreign same-sex marriages, and that such marriages are contrary to their public
policy.5  Some of them have very strong language, describing same-sex
marriages as "void" or "prohibited." The federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) holds that no state need recognize same-sex marriages from other
states. These provisions are widely understood as enacting a blanket rule of
nonrecognition, under which states would "ignore marriage licenses granted to
same-sex couples in other states." 6 Under the blanket nonrecognition rule, a
4. Id. at 630 (Wright, J., concurring).
5. These laws are collected in the appendix to Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Interstate Recognition], which updates and supersedes the compilation in Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996).
6. This formulation appears in two executive orders issued a few days apart by Governors Kirk
Fordice of Mississippi and Fob James, Jr. of Alabama, declaring that they would not recognize same-sex
marriages. See State of Mississippi, Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 770 (Aug. 22, 1996)
(same-sex marriage in another state "shall not be recognized as a valid marriage, shall produce no civil
effects nor confer any of the benefits, burdens or obligations of marriage .... ); State of Alabama,
Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 24 (Aug. 29, 1996) (same).
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state's courts would never recognize any same-sex union for any purpose
whatsoever.
In earlier writings (and in a forthcoming book), I have offered a very
different analysis, working through the question of interstate recognition of
same-sex marriage as if it were an ordinary problem of choice of law, in which
state and individual interests are to be balanced against each other in
conventional, lawyerlike fashion. 7  This analysis yields the conclusion that
there is no simple, unitary answer to the question whether same-sex marriages
from other states should be recognized.8
There are four different categories of situation in which the recognition
question might arise.9  Each category, I have argued, presents different
problems and requires a different analysis.
The first category, "evasive" marriages, 10 includes cases in which parties
have traveled out of their home state for the express purpose of evading that
state's prohibition of their marriages, and thereafter immediately returned
home. Such marriages will be invalid if they violate the strong public policy of
the couple's home state. And such a public policy is clearly indicated by the 40
states that have enacted laws to that effect.II
The second category, "migratory" marriages, includes cases in which the
parties did not intend to evade the law of any state when they married, but
contracted a marriage valid where they lived, and subsequently moved to a
state where their marriage was prohibited. These will be complicated, even if
there is a statute denying recognition to the marriage. Property claims arising
out of a marriage cannot be simply annulled by the decision of one spouse to
move to another state, and the marriage must be an impediment to the
remarriage of either of the partners. Moreover, if the incident of marriage in
7. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW
(2002) [hereinafter GAY RIGHTS QUESTION]; Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense
of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage. Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Andrew Koppelman,
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions after Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1265
(2004); Interstate Recognition, supra note 5.
8. Actually, my view is that such marriages should always be recognized, because withholding
recognition unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex. See Andrew Koppelman, Defending the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 519 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 220-234 (1994). But I understand that courts will not soon
accept this argument, and that there are sound reasons for them to be cautious about intervening in this
area too soon. See GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 7, at 141-54.
9. The following argument is elaborated in Interstate Recognition, supra note 5.
10. 1 borrow this useful nomenclature from Note, Developments in the Law - The Law of Marriage
and Family: Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2028, 2038 (2003) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
11. Three other states, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Wyoming, have laws against same-sex
marriage that were enacted before interstate recognition became a live issue in the 1990s. They do not
contemplate foreign same-sex marriages, and it is less clear whether they state a strong public policy
against recognition.
2005]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
question is one that could have been conferred by contract under the forum's
law, such as the right to make medical decisions for one's partner, then the
state's policy cannot be offended by the mere fact that the couple took
advantage of a legal shortcut to that right created by another state's law.
The third category, and the one that most urgently demands clarity, is
"'visitor" marriages, in which a couple or a member of a couple is temporarily
present in a state that does not recognize their marriage. Though there is little
authority that addresses this precise question, such marriages should always be
recognized, for all purposes. It is ridiculous for travelers' marriages to blink on
and off like a strobe light as they cross state lines.
The fourth category is "extraterritorial" cases in which the parties have
never lived within the state, but in which the marriage is relevant to litigation
conducted there. For example, after the death intestate of one spouse, the other
may seek to inherit property that was located within the forum state. In these
cases, there is clear authority in favor of recognition.
Of course, this analysis invites the objection that I have understated the
passions to which this issue gives rise. One may feel that what I have proposed
here does not give enough weight to state interests against same-sex marriage
recognition, since it would require recognition of those relationships in some
circumstances. Lemmon shows that a different approach is possible.
A state might want to say that same-sex marriages are so abominable that
they will not be recognized, ever, for any purpose. Just as slavery could not
exist in New York, one might argue, a state can legitimately decide that same-
sex marriage simply cannot exist within its borders. One might say, as some
judges said of interracial marriages that crossed state lines, that the relation is
"severed the instant they set foot upon our soil," and that "individuals who have
formed relations which are obnoxious to our laws can find their comfort in
staying away from us."'12 By this logic, any obligations created by a same-sex
marriage would evaporate the instant the affected party set foot within the
borders of such a state.
In this Article, I will explain why a blanket rule of nonrecognition,
analogous to that proposed in Lemmon, is unworkable. There are four fatal
difficulties. First, a blanket nonrecognition rule produces absurd and cruel
results. Second, that rule is inconsistent with the rights of citizens within the
federal system. Third, it would violate rights to equal protection established by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it would
reflect a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. And fourth, the rule
cannot be justified even in terms of the strongest and most attractive version of
the conservative case against same-sex marriage.
12. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 250 (I 877) (Reade, J., dissenting).
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I. ABSURD RESULTS
Begin with the consequences of the rule.
Parties to marriages could dissolve them without any obligation to account
for the marital assets, possibly leaving a dependent spouse deprived of assets
that that spouse has spent years helping to amass.
A same-sex spouse could marry again in a second state without having to
dissolve the earlier marriage or even having to disclose to the new spouse the
existence of the previous marriage. That previous marriage would continue in
existence in the place of celebration, effectively legalizing a form of polygamy.
More generally, blanket nonrecognition would mean that states following
that rule would become havens for avoiding obligations of spousal property and
child support that had been validly entered into pursuant to Massachusetts
law.1
3
Travelers to a state whose marital rights and obligations unexpectedly
became relevant would not be able to rely on those rights and obligations.
Suppose Jane, who is married in Massachusetts to Sally, travels on business to
Virginia and there is hurt in a car crash. Sally would not be permitted to make
medical decisions for Jane. She might not even be permitted to visit her in the
hospital.
If the children of such relationships were brought into the state, voluntarily
or by force, their nonbiological parents would have no right to get them back.
If Jane were the biological mother of Adam, and Adam were injured in the
same crash, Sally could not make medical decisions for him, or visit him,
either. Under the blanket nonrecognition rule, this is what she would be told:
"You may not visit Jane or Adam, because only family members may visit
patients here, and you are not a family member of either of these people in any
respect which our state recognizes. You may not visit, or participate in medical
decisions for, either of them. If Jane dies, you will not have any parental rights
in Adam. When he recovers, the hospital cannot release him to you, and you
cannot take him back to Massachusetts with you. If there is no surviving
biological relative, we will regard Adam as an orphan, and place him in foster
care."
The same thing would happen if, after Jane had died, Adam was kidnapped
from his backyard by a stranger and carried across state lines. The kidnapper
doubtless would be prosecuted, but Adam would still end up in foster care.
Advocates of the blanket rule of nonrecognition have never attempted to
defend these results. That is probably because they have never thought about
them.
13. See Joseph W. Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of
Obligation, I STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & Civ. Lia. (forthcoming 2004).
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II. FEDERALISM
The second problem with a blanket nonrecognition rule is that it is
probably unconstitutional. It violates states' obligations to one another within
the federal system. Lemmon is a bad precedent. It makes us want to cheer, of
course, but that is because we no longer believe in a federalist solution to the
slavery question. Jonathan Lemmon was not entitled to own slaves anywhere.
That, however, is not what the case says. Its actual reasoning, which
effectively made interstate migration with their property impossible for many
slaveholders, didn't make sense in a federal system. Slavery was sanctioned
and protected in the original Constitution.' 4  Other obstacles to interstate
commerce have been invalidated by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Supreme Court once struck down an Illinois law that required trucks to use
curved mudguards behind their tires. 15 All of the neighboring states permitted
straight mudguards, and one other state made curved mudguards illegal. The
upshot was that trucks would either have to avoid Illinois or stop at the border
to change their mudguards. Illinois had a legitimate interest in regulating
trucks on its own roads, of course. But it couldn't enforce those regulations if
the effect would be to impede the shipping of goods across state lines.
If differential mudflap rules are too great an obstacle to interstate
commerce, certainly so is an absolute bar on passage through a state. And this
is the basis on which the Lemmon case would likely have been resolved. Had
the Civil War not intervened, Lemmon would probably have been overruled.
At a minimum, New York might have been required to respect the slave
property of transients. 16  Unpublished notes in the papers of Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney indicate that when the war broke out, he may already have
been preparing to write an opinion vindicating the "obligation of all to respect
the institution of slavery."'
7
A related federalism issue arises out of the constitutional right to travel.
"We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same
community must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it
without interruption, as freely as in our own States."' 18 On this basis, the Court
invalidated a one dollar tax on persons who wanted to leave a state. If this is
impermissible, then a fortiori the right to travel precludes the much heavier
burden of dissolving one's closest family relations as the price of interstate
travel.
14. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of
Congressional representation); art. I, § 9 (barring Congress from interfering with the slave trade until
1808); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (guaranteeing return of fugitive slaves); art. V (barring any amendment
restricting the slave trade before 1808).
15. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
16. See FINKELMAN, supra note 1, at 313-38.
17. Quoted in id. at 338 n.76.
18. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868).
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION
The third difficulty of the blanket recognition rule is that it is
unconstitutional in yet another way. It violates equal protection.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'19 It
was on this basis that the Supreme Court invalidated segregated schools and laws
against interracial marriage. The Court's two most recent gay rights decisions
suggest that a blanket rule of nonrecognition, of the kind authorized by DOMA,
would probably be unconstitutional for similar reasons.
Romer v. Evans struck down an amendment to the Colorado constitution
(referred to on the ballot as "Amendment 2"), which provided that neither the
state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit discrimination on the basis of
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships. The amendment, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
observed, "has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group. 22 The amendment seemed to "deprive[]
gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that
prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings. ' 23 The
Court concluded that "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. '24 The broad
disability imposed on a targeted group "raise[d] the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is bom of animosity toward the class of persons affected.
[I]f the constitutional concept of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.'
25
Romer's holding may thus be summarized: If a law targets a narrowly defined
group and then imposes upon it disabilities that are so broad and
undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any legitimate
governmental interest, then the Court will infer that the law's purpose is simply
to harm that group, and so will invalidate the law.26
Seven years later, in Lawrence v. Texas,27 the Supreme Court invalidated a
law that criminalized homosexual sex. The Court held that the statute "furthers
19. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
20. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
21. Id. at 624.
22. Id. at 632.
23. Id. at 630.
24. Id. at 635.
25. Id. at 634 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), quotations
omitted).
26. This reading of Romer is elaborated and defended in Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and
Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89 (1997).
27. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual., 28 The Court relied on Romer to hold that the
precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick, which held sodomy unprotected by the right
to privacy, had "sustained serious erosion. ' 29 The Court did not explain just
how Romer eroded Hardwick. A fuller explanation appeared in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. O'Connor would have invalidated the Texas law
under the equal protection clause, arguing that it, like the law in Romer,
exhibits "a desire to harm a politically unpopular group" 30 Quoting Romer,
she concluded that the Texas statute "raise[s] the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.",31  The majority did not expressly embrace O'Connor's equal
protection theory, but it does declare it to be "a tenable argument."
32
Part of what troubled the Court in Lawrence was the fact that sodomy laws
singling out gays are a fairly recent development in the law, only arising in the
1970s.33 Similarly in Romer, the Court was troubled that the challenged
disqualification "is unprecedented in our jurisprudence," and it declared that
"[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort."3
4
Extraordinary burdens, it appears, arouse suspicion. And the more unusual the
burden, the more likely it is that the law will be held unconstitutional.
Together, Lawrence and Romer establish a fairly clear rule: If a law singles
out gays for unprecedentedly harsh treatment, the Court will presume that what
is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral disapproval. 35 In
both cases, the statute in question singled out gays for extraordinarily harsh
treatment. That is what blanket nonrecognition would do, too. Every single
way in which it changes existing law is unprecedented, and is so bizarre as to
be indefensible.
This argument invites the following response. Not all antigay legislation,
not even legislation that severely disadvantages gays, is the result of hostility
and a bare desire to harm an unpopular group. Justice Scalia thought that, so far
from manifesting a bare desire to harm gays, the law struck down in Romer was
"a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws."
36
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. at 576.
30. Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
33. See id. at 570.
34. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
35. This interpretation of Lawrence is elaborated and defended in Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's
Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2004).
36. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being
or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain
conduct reprehensible - murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals - and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that is
the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual
conduct .... 37
The inference of impermissible motive, he thought, was therefore uncalled
for. The Court's opinion "disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional
attitudes," Scalia concluded, was "nothing short of insulting."
38
Scalia is half right. The problem is that laws that discriminate against gays
often both express moral disapproval and reflect a desire to harm an unpopular
group. Opposition to gay rights is a complex combination of serious moral
disagreement and vicious prejudice.
Many Americans oppose same-sex marriage because they are Christians or
Jews who interpret the Bible as forbidding homosexual conduct. Motivation of
this kind does not necessarily deny anyone equal concern and respect. The
equal dignity of all human beings is a foundational belief in both Judaism and
Christianity; as an historical matter, these faiths are where contemporary
secular liberals got the idea from.
But there is a lot of antigay animus in the United States that religion cannot
explain. Throughout the United States, gay people are subjected to random
violence, often of a remarkable viciousness. This kind of behavior is not
required, but rather is forbidden, by mainstream Christianity.
Many traditionalists have even recognized the existence of prejudices
against gay status and have understood that they need to dissociate themselves
from it.39 The Catholic Church, for example, has condemned antigay prejudice
while maintaining its condemnation of homosexual activity. The Church's
doctrine does not entail that a person is morally defective and unclean merely
because of homosexual desire. Quite the contrary; "the particular inclination of
the homosexual person is not a sin.'4°  Ralph Reed, the former executive
director of the Christian Coalition, writes that "the Bible makes it clear that
homosexuality is a deviation from normative sexual conduct and God's laws,"
but also finds "disturbing" declarations by religious conservatives "that AIDS
is 'God's judgment' on the gay community," and declares that "the deeply-held
moral beliefs of Christians regarding this practice do not justify hateful or spite-
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 652.
39. A notable and troubling exception is the Boy Scouts of America. See Andrew Koppelman, Are
the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists? Judging the Scouts' Antigay Policy, 18 PUB. AFF. Q. 363
(2004).
40. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to Bishops on the Pastoral Care of
Homosexual Persons, 32 THE POPE SPEAKS 62 (1987).
20051
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
filled intolerance of homosexuality. ' I1 These conservatives understand that the
moral objections to homosexual conduct that they want to defend can become
rationalizations for vicious and hateful abuse.
Romer and Lawrence together establish that the more unusual the burden a
law imposes on gays, the more likely it is that the law will be held
unconstitutional. Traditional moralists will object that this presumption is
unfair. If one thinks one's moral views correct, changing circumstances may
require that one pursue those moral views through novel means. The novelty of
the means, one might reasonably argue, should not automatically entail a
presumption of bad motive. Some contemporary antigay rules are
unprecedented, but the emergence of an active, widespread gay rights
movement is also unprecedented. A prohibition such as the Texas law that
singled out homosexual sex, invalidated in Lawrence, is one possible response
to that movement. The Texas law could be, and was, supported by people of
good will who do not question the equal dignity of gay people.42
The answer is that every legal presumption that protects some interest
against the state has costs. It will surely impair some legitimate government
interest. A rule that the state may not discriminate on the basis of race will
sometimes prevent the state from pursuing legitimate ends.43 A strong First
Amendment will protect some worthless and harmful speech. 44 If those rules
are not unfair, neither is this one. But the concern about unfairness to
conservative views takes us to the final argument against blanket
nonrecognition of same-sex marriages.
IV. THE BEST ARGUMENT AGAINST SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
There is a fourth, and perhaps it is the deepest, reason why Lemmon is a
poor precedent to rely on in the same-sex marriage controversy. The
conservative argument against same-sex marriage, in its most thoughtful and
humane form, does not entail a blanket rule of nonrecognition.
The conservative position has changed over time. Not long ago, courts
were routinely willing to void, on grounds of undue influence, wills in which
45gay people attempted to leave their estates to their partners. Almost no
41. RALPH REED, ACTIVE FAITH: How CHRISTIANS ARE CHANGING THE SOUL OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 264-66 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or
One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997).
43. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99 (1986).
44. "[l]f the state needs no stronger justification for dealing with speech than it needs for dealing
with other forms of conduct, then the principle of freedom of speech is only an illusion." FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 8 (1982). See also George Kateb, The Freedom
of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 220 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996).
45. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
225 (1981).
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conservatives are willing today to support that result. Slavery did not have a
right to exist. Same-sex relationships do. Few conservatives want to use the
law to stamp them out. They simply do not want such relationships to be given
the special treatment that is given to heterosexual marriages.
It may help clarify the controversy to note that the debate over same-sex
marriage is really two different debates. The first is a normative debate about
what relationships to value or even to sanctify. The second is a debate about
administration - about which relationships ought to have legal consequences.
The normative debate, which has religious dimensions for many, concerns
what relationships are intrinsically valuable. The key question is one about
objective moral reality: Are same-sex relationships morally equal to
heterosexual relationships, or do heterosexual relationships partake of a good
that homosexual relationships cannot possibly share?
On this issue, Americans are di'ided, with different groups adhering to two
very different moral visions. According to the anti-same-sex marriage vision,
sex can be morally worthy precisely and only because of its place in
procreation. Even the marriages of infertile heterosexual couples take their
meaning from the fact that they form a union of the procreative kind, and their
bodily union therefore has procreative significance. From this perspective, the
movement for same-sex marriage is a misguided attempt to deny fundamental
moral distinctions.
According to the other moral vision, sex is valuable, either in itself, or
because it draws us toward friendship of a singular degree and kind. This
bringing together of persons has intrinsic worth, whether or not it leads to
childbearing or child-rearing. On this account, sexuality is linked to the
flourishing of the next generation only to the extent that it is one of a number of
factors that can bond adults together into stable familial units in which children
are likely to thrive. It is not necessary or even important that the children be
the biological product of the adults' sex acts. From this perspective, it is the
devaluation of same-sex intimacy that is immoral, because it reflects arbitrary
and irrational discrimination.
The administrative debate concerns what relationships between persons
ought to be given legal recognition. Here the issue is the more mundane one of
how resources should be allocated and unfair disruption of people's lives
prevented. Like it or not, relationships of dependency exist in a wide range of
households. From those relationships, one can reasonably infer what the
members of those households would want and need if some unprovided-for
contingency arises, such as the illness or death of one of its members.
Financial issues such as inheritance and employer benefits for dependents of
employees also come into play.
From the administrative perspective, law ought to do its best to reflect
people's preferences and provide the default options that they would probably
2005]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
have chosen if they had thought about it. The task of constructing the law of
marriage is analogous to the task of constructing the law of business
corporations: How can the state maximize efficiency and satisfy people's
preferences about their relationships by constructing sensible "one size fits all"
default rules, while protecting the interests of third parties, notably children?
Here it all turns on what we know about the effects of various practices and
policies. Religious notions of sanctification are very far from our minds.
One can address the administrative question without taking any position on
the moral one. That is how many jurisdictions have approached the issue,
granting same-sex couples some or all of the rights of married couples without
the honorific of "marriage." In the United States, Vermont and California have
adopted such a policy. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland have
partnerships that are nearly identical to marriage, while a more limited set of
rights and responsibilities are available to same-sex couples in France,
Germany, Austria, Hungary, South Africa, Portugal, and parts of Australia,
New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.4 6  The American constitutional
amendment failed in part because it was so broadly worded that it prohibited
civil unions as well as same-sex marriages.
Conservatives care far more about the normative issue than they do about
the administrative one. Those who oppose civil unions do so because such
unions give state recognition to homosexual relationships as such. They do not
object to the use of neutral legal instruments to accommodate such
relationships. They typically argue that many of the same legal results can be
accomplished by wills, contracts, powers of attorney, and other generally
available legal instruments. Thus, for example, President George W. Bush has
suggested that gay couples can secure many of the benefits of marriage, such as
the right to hospital visitation, through civil contracts.47 They implicitly reject
the result in the undue influence cases, mentioned earlier, which held, in effect,
that such instruments would not be given effect if gay people used them.
The conservative position on the normative question deserves respect, even
from those who disagree with it. Questions of ultimate value are notoriously
resistant to rational resolution.48 Decent people conscientiously come to
different views about whether same-sex relationships can be morally equivalent
46. See Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and
Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 569 (2004); LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes, eds., 2001).
47. Jennifer 8. Lee, Congressman Says Bush Spoke About Options on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
February 9, 2004, at A15.
48. Attempts to rationalize the conservative position have not been successful. See GAY RIGHTS
QUESTION, supra note 7, at 80-93 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case
Against Same-Sex Marriage, ST. THOMAS L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); Andrew Koppelman, Is
Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. OF JuRIS. 51 (1997). But this may simply reflect the
intractability of all such value judgments.
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to opposite-sex relationships. And in a federal system, different views will be
reflected in different states' laws.
The most charitable interpretation of the federal DOMA and the state mini-
DOMAs is that they are defensive, and seek only to prevent those states from
having to recognize continuing same-sex marriages within their borders. Their
authors were worried primarily about the evasion case, and generally gave no
thought at all to other cases. They wanted their own states' laws to maintain
the normative position that heterosexual marriages partake of a good that same-
sex marriages cannot possibly share.
But if the situation is one of self-defense, then there are some rules from
the law of self-defense that are relevant. In criminal law, if you are attacked,
you have a right to defend yourself. But your defense needs to be necessary
and proportional to the scale of the attack. 49 No matter how badly your attacker
behaved, your self-defense plea won't fly if he has been shot more than once,
especially if some of the wounds are in his back.5°
Some of the antigay laws that are now being passed go far beyond the
protection of an ideal of marriage. They inflict serious harm in order to make a
purely symbolic point. For instance, Florida expresses its disapproval of
homosexual conduct with a statute that forbids gays from adopting children.
Defenders of the statute claim that they believe children are best raised by
parents of different sexes, but they ignore the actual consequence of the law,
which is that large numbers of gay foster parents are barred from adopting the
children who have grown up in their households. 51 These children are in fact
dependent on the relationships that the law refuses to recognize. Whatever this
law is concerned with, it is not the welfare of these children.
The state mini-DOMAs have sometimes gone overboard in just the same
way. For example, Virginia's legislature, dissatisfied with the mini-DOMA
already on the books, enacted over the governor's veto a broad law making
"void and unenforceable" any "civil union, partnership contract or other
arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the
privileges or obligations of marriage., 52 The governor worried about "the
rights of people to enter into legal relationships," 53 but the legislation was
enacted without amendment over his veto. The consequence is that some
same-sex couples have begun to leave Virginia, fearful that their wills, powers
49. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)-(d) (1984).
50. 1 know this sounds like something I made up, but see People v. Seiber, 394 N.E. 2d 1044 (I11.
App. Ct. 1979); People v. Glenn, 417 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 418
N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Collins, 306 So.2d 662 (La. 1975).
51. See Lynn Waddell, Gays in Florida Seek Adoption Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at
A20.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004).
53. Laura L. Hutchison, Couple Feels Forced to Leave, FREDRICKSBURG FREE LANCE-STAR, Jan.
9, 2005, available at http://www.fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2005/012005/01092005/1627908 (last
visited Apr. 12, 2005).
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of attorney, and medical directives would be unenforceable. One
Fredericksburg couple felt pressured to move away after living there for 40
years. The state attorney general, defending the law's constitutionality, denied
that the law would have that effect. "The purpose of this legislation is not to
prohibit business partnership agreements, medical directives, joint bank
accounts, or any other rights or privileges not exclusive to the institution of
marriage." 54 But what he is offering is a narrowing construction of the law,
that makes its reach less sweeping than its plain language suggests. One
Virginia court has now claimed that the state's laws mean that no parental
status arising out of Vermont's civil union laws can be recognized in
Virginia.
5
Jonathan Lemmon was not treated this harshly. New York would not let
him keep his slaves, but a private fund-raising effort collected $5000 to
compensate him for the loss of his only property, and the judge who freed his
slaves contributed to the fund. 6 Even with respect to slavery, the country
understood that there were human beings on the other side of the issue, and that
if possible, their lives should not be destroyed.
It is possible to construe the mini-DOMA laws narrowly, and therefore
avoid the danger that they be found unconstitutional. It appears that a lot of use
will have to be made of this kind of narrowing device, since laws that lash out
wildly at gay people keep getting passed.
More nuanced conflicts rules will not make everyone happy. They may
not make anyone happy. Neither side gets the total victory it seeks. But the
approach advocated here does accommodate the most pressing interests on noth
sides. It is the least bad answer to the problem.
So why would anyone support it?
Same-sex marriage is not likely to spread very widely in the United States
in the near future. Public opinion is too strongly against it. But there are signs
that this will change. Polls reflect a generational divide on the issue: while
most Americans oppose it, most 18-to-29-year-olds are in favor. 57 The long-
54. Id.
55. See Christina Nuckols, Two Women, Two States, One Child, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 13, 2004,
available at http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=79273&ran=16653 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2005); Jonathan Finer, Judge Claims Control of Same-Sex Custody Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6946-2004Sep8.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2005).
56. See FINKELMAN, supra note 1, at 297.
57. "Younger people are much more likely than older Americans to support gay marriage."
CBSNews.com, Gay Marriage Battle Lines Drawn, July 31, 2003, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/03/politics/main566402.shtml (last visited Apr. 28, 2005)
(comparing 61% support for gay marriage among 18 to 29 year olds with 18% support among people 65
years and older). See also Press Release, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Republicans
Unified, Democrats Split on Gay Marriage: Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality,
Nov. 18, 2003, at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-homosexuality.pdf (last visited Apr.
28, 2005) (citing statistics showing correlation between support for gay marriage and age of
respondent); Ruy Teixeira, Center for American Progress, Gay Marriage: Not Such a Big Deal After
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term hopes of the same-sex marriage movement are perhaps the most powerful
reason why opponents are so eager to cement their position into the law now,
while political forces still favor them.
If those who oppose same-sex marriage are going to have any chance to
prevail, they will have to work harder to dissociate themselves from the charge
of bigotry and hysteria. In particular, they need to be more discriminating
about which legal rules they will advocate. They should oppose same-sex
marriage, of course, but they should also oppose the kind of broad antigay
legislation that we have just seen in Florida and Virginia. What we need is
competition of a benign sort. Each side should intensely compete to show that
it is more reasonable than the other.
All?, May 26, 2004, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.aspc=biJRJ80VF&b=83165
(last visited Apr. 28, 2005) (64% of 18 to 29 year olds support gay marriage as compared to 51%
national average).
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